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FOR MANY years we have heard bitter debate
about U.S. investments abroad. From Canada, South
America, Europe, and Asia came serious complaints
that U.S. capital was taking over their industries and
draining their economies of resources. Now, with an
apparently significant increase in foreign investment
in the United States, sounds of alarm are beginning to
be heard from our own businessmen and politicians.
We have read that Japanese purchases of hotels, lum-
ber stands, and land are contributing to shortages and
inflation. We hear that our “need” for Middle Eastern
oil is such that the oil-rich countries will eventually
accumulate enough dollars to purchase and, in turn,
control our industry.
The purpose of this note is to examine the impact
of foreign investment on inflation and welfare, and
to assess the probability of a foreign takeover of
American industry. The analysis is addressed only to
the investment aspect of foreign trade and not to the
impact of transactions in current goods and services.
Furthermore, it is assumed that all transactions are
undertaken by individual decision makers who are in-
terested in maximizing their profits or wealth rather
than by governments for strategic or tactical purposes.
Does Foreign investment increase Our
Cost of Living?
First, let us discuss the question of whether in-
creased foreign investment causes inflationary pres-
sures and whether it has been a factor in the recent
dramatic increase in consumer prices. To be consistent
with the events of the past several years, this issue
should be analyzed under two conditions: one in
which foreigners have no accumulated dollar assets
and, as is the case now, one in which they do.
If foreigners did not have accumulated dollar bal-
ances and wished to buy a capital asset in the United
States, they would first have to acquire dollars. In
order to do this they would have to sell an equivalent
amount of goods to U.S. residents. As a result of this
process, the dollar holdings of U.S. residents who
bought the imports would decline, and those of for-
eigners would increase. In turn, as these foreign dollar
balances were drawn down, those of U.S. residents
who sold capital assets would increase. The U.S.
money stock would remain the same; thus there would
be no reason to expect additional spending and addi-
tional inflationary pressure. To be sure, the prices of
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the capital assets demanded would have a tendency
to increase. On the other hand, Americans would have
been induced to import more only if the prices of
these imported goods were lower than prices of simi-
lar goods produced domestically.
Furthermore, consider the welfare implications of
these events, We would have traded some claims on
capital assets for some goods or services and, in the
process, some prices would have changed. Presum-
ably, trade was entered into willingly by those in-
volved because they found it profitable or because
it increased their satisfaction. Thus, even if there
was a relative increase in some prices, society would
still be better off than it was prior to the trade.
Now consider the situation in which foreigners
have accumulated dollar assets from trades in the
past. ‘What is the current impact of foreign invest-
ment? If, as has been common practice, this dollar
accumulation by foreigners is held in the form of U.S.
Treasury securities, then these securities would have
to be sold. The dollar balances of the securities buy-
ers would decline and those of the sellers of claims
on capital assets would increase. Again, this action
alone would not increase our money stock and, hence,
would not be a source of inflationary pressures. The
prices of claims on capital assets demanded by for-
eigners would have a tendency to rise while the
prices of the Treasury securities they are selling would
tend to decline.
If, however, these accumulated balances were held
in the form of foreign central bank balances at the
Federal Reserve Banks, then the spending of these
balances would increase the money stock and add fuel
to inflationary pressures in the United States, In fact,
this is not likely to occur; these central bank balances
are relatively small and are usually maintained at a
relatively stable level for use in day-to-day transac-
tions. A significant reduction of these balances, in
view of their small size as compared to foreign hold-
ings of Treasury bills, is highly unlikely. Therefore,
even if foreign investment were to continue to in-
crease at the rapid pace exhibited in the past several
months, its impact on inflation would be negligible.
And since this investment is undertaken voluntarily
by all the trading partners, we must presume that it
will benefit society as a whole.
Can Foreigners Cain “Control” of
US. industry?
Another frequently heard argument is that because
of our insatiable desire for oil, foreign oil producers
will accumulate vast dollar reserves with which they
will buy up U.S. industry and eventually control our
productive facilities. We can interpret this statement
in the follosving way: (1) irrespective of price we
will keep buying the same or increasing amounts of
oil from Middle Eastern producers; (2) these pro-
ducer countries will buy goods and services from the
United States at a rate which will be a relatively
stable proportion of their oil revenues; (3) the re-
maining “surplus” will be spent on U.S. productive
assets irrespective of their price; and (4) foreign
“control” of these assets would somehow be “bad.”
Suppose for a moment, as improbable as it may be,
that we were to buy foreign oil at a rate like that
postulated above, and that all of the surplus revenue
earned by foreign oil producing countries was spent
on investments in the United States. If this continued
into infinity, and the U.S. economy grew at a slower
rate than our purchases of oil, it would be theoretically
possible for Middle Eastern oil producers to gain “con-
trol” of our industry. \\hether this “control” would
he good or bad is not at all clear. As we have
discussed previously, such transactions ultimately
amount to a voluntary exchange of our productive
asset ownership for foreign oil. This exchange, if
undertaken by individuals and in the absence of
coercion, must be economically beneficial to them.
But what about the future? So long as our industry
produces all the goods and services that we are willing
to purchase, why should we be so concerned about
ownership? If foreign ownership is undesirable from
the political point of view, or from a strategic point of
view during a war, foreign owners could he controlled
by legal sanctions. But there are no economic grounds
for the evaluation of foreign versus domestic owner-
ship. Besides, if the sellers of these domestic assets
still wished to oxvn income-producing goods, and if
these goods were too expensive at home because of
foreign demand, they could buy foreign assets, per-
haps even exploratory rights of oil fields abroad. But
such speculation about what could happen and about
the welfare implications of foreign ownership is not
very realistic; we should really take a look at the
possibility of such foreign capital invasion occurring
even under the very pessimistic assumptions made
above.
Let us speculate on how large this foreign invest-
ment in the United States could be and whether it
could give foreigners “control” over our industry. We
can proceed with the previously made interpretations
of the argument which will yield the strongest case
for it.
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Estimates have been made that U.S. oil reserves
will be depleted in 10 years and Middle Eastern and
North African reserves in 60 years.’ Let us assume
that our oil consumption would rise at a constant rate
associated with the growth of our real GNP and that
after 10 years our domestic oil output would have to
be fully supplanted by greater imports from the Mid-
dle East and North Africa. Let us further assume that
their imports from the United States would rise at,
say, 5 percent per year, and that the remaining dollar
surplus would be spent buying capital assets in the
United States. Trade between Middle Eastern coun-
tries and the world outside of the United States is
excluded from consideration because such trade, in
relation to the investment in the United States, would
set off repercussions on the exchange rate which would
violate our assumption of price constancy.
Chart I shows the projected U.S. imports of oil
from the Eastern Hemisphere and the projected U.S.
exports to these countries. The projections are based
on the assumption that U.S. oil consumption will re-
main at 0.7 percent2 of our real GNP which will rise
at a 4 percent annual rate. Further, it is assumed that
the exports of U.S. goods and services to oil produc-
‘See Walter J. Levy, “Oil Power,” Foreign Affairs (July 1971),
p. 653.
2T1’ds percentage has prevailed for the past 10 years.
ing countries will rise at 5 percent per annum, and
that the Western Hemisphere’s oil reserves will be
depleted in 10 years. The cumulative difference be-
tween U.S. oil imports and U.S. exports to oil-produc-
ing countries is assumed to be the amount of foreign
dollar accumulation which is then invested in the
ownership of U.S. industry3
Chart II shows projections of the growth of non-
human assets in the United States and projected ac-
cumulation of U.S. assets by foreigners resulting from
import-export activities depicted in Chart I. The U.S.
asset growth is simply the projected GNP multiplied
by a factor of 3.5, which assumes that approximately
28 percent of our total factors of production will con-
sist of non-human assets. All of the assumptions are
admittedly simplistic yet not unreasonable.
There are two points in time that we should be
concerned with — 1992 and 2030. One estimate of the
Eastern Hemisphere’s oil supply is 250 billion bar-
rels.4 Another one states that this supply will run out
3
ltis assumed that: U.S. oil production will remain constant
(4.1 billion barrels per year), due to limits on the refining
capacity, until U.S. reserves are depleted; oil reserves in the
Westem Hemisphere will be depleted at the same time as
U.S. reserves; and the price will remain at $2.50 per barrel.
~“Tankers that Move the Oil that Moves the World,” Fortune
(September 1, 1967).
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in 60 years.5 If we take the first estimate and assume
that our projected U.S. oil consumption is one-half of
total world oil consumption, then the reserves will be
used up in 1992. The other estimate puts us in the
year 2030.
As can be seen in Chart II, in 1992 the value of our
non-human productive assets would be $6,100 billion
and the maximum accumulation of foreign-owned as-
sets would reach $232 billion or 3.8 percent. If we
consider the year 2030, the value of assets would
5Levy, “Oil Power,” p. 653.
reach $26,900 billion and foreign ownership $2,600
billion or 9.6 percent. In either case it would not pro-
duce foreign “control” of our industry.
This simple exercise is not intended to make accu-
rate predictions into the future. Some reasonable as-
sumptions of growth have been made and constant
prices and exchange rates have been presumed. In-
creases in prices of traded assets may tend to narrow
the accumulation of dollar reserves. Thus, the case
presented here tends to overstate the possible acquisi-
tion of U.S. assets by foreigners. Even under these
pessimistic circumstances the assertion of foreign con-
trol of U.S. industry becomes ridiculous.
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